CEO Managerial Ability, Corporate Investment Quality, and the Value of Cash

@inproceedings{Gan2015CEOMA,
  title={CEO Managerial Ability, Corporate Investment Quality, and the Value of Cash},
  author={H. Gan},
  year={2015}
}
  • H. Gan
  • Published 2015
  • Business
    • CEO MANAGERIAL ABILITY, CORPORATE INVESTMENT QUALITY, AND THE VALUE OF CASH 
    View via Publisher
    core.ac.uk
    4 Citations
    Highly Influencial Citations
    1
    Background Citations
    2
    4 Citations
    Citation Type

    Citation Type

    The Managerial Ability and Value of Cash: Evidence from Iran
    • 1
    • PDF
    Do Talented Managers Invest More Efficiently? The Moderating Role of Corporate Governance Mechanisms
    The Study of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) Effect on the Relationship between Managerial Ability and Investment Efficiency Increase
    Do talented managers invest more efficiently? The moderating role of corporate governance mechanisms
    • 12

    References

    SHOWING 1-10 OF 125 REFERENCES
    Management Entrenchment the Case of Manager-specific Investments*
    • R. W. Vishn
    • 2001
    • 561
    • Highly Influential
    • PDF
    Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?
    • 2,046
    • Highly Influential
    • PDF
    Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US
    • 1,042
    • Highly Influential
    • PDF
    Accounting Quality and Firm-Level Capital Investment
    • 653
    • Highly Influential
    • PDF
    Methods of Valuation for Mergers and Acquisitions
    • 7
    Corporate capital budgeting and CEO turnover
    • 11
    • Highly Influential
    • PDF
    Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns
    • 1,351
    • Highly Influential
    • PDF
    The Method of Payment in Corporate Acquisitions, Investment Opportunities, and Management Ownership
    • 594
    Founder-CEOs, investment decisions, and stock market performance
    • 379
    • Highly Influential
    • PDF
    Does Investment-Related Pressure Lead to Misreporting? An Analysis of Reporting Following M&A Transactions
    • 41