CEO Compensation and Board Structure

  title={CEO Compensation and Board Structure},
  author={Vidhi Chhaochharia and Yaniv Grinstein},
  journal={IO: Regulation},
In response to corporate scandals in 2001 and 2002, major U.S. stock exchanges issued new board requirements to enhance board oversight. We find a significant decrease in CEO compensation for firms that were more affected by these requirements, compared with firms that were less affected, taking into account unobservable firm effects, time-varying industry effects, size, and performance. The decrease in compensation is particularly pronounced in the subset of affected firms with no outside… 

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