Corpus ID: 155379440

CEO Compensation, Information Asymmetry, and Other Characteristics

@inproceedings{Huang2015CEOCI,
  title={CEO Compensation, Information Asymmetry, and Other Characteristics},
  author={Di Huang},
  year={2015}
}
This dissertation consists of three essays on various aspects of corporate finance. In the first essay, we examine the mean effect and volatility effect of CEO pay gap from creditors' perspective. Prior literature suggests that CEO pay gap relates positively to both the mean and the volatility of the stock return distribution. The mean effect and volatility effect of CEO pay gap yield opposite predictions regarding the creditors' reactions to CEO pay gap. In this study, we systematically study… Expand

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