Buying a Lottery Ticket to Help the Poor

@article{Jankowski2002BuyingAL,
  title={Buying a Lottery Ticket to Help the Poor},
  author={Richard Jankowski},
  journal={Rationality and Society},
  year={2002},
  volume={14},
  pages={55 - 77}
}
A core problem of rational-actor models for politics is the seeming irrationality of voting, namely, that it is irrational for voters to vote and to be informed about politics. A simple cost-benefit analysis indicates that the probability of one's vote being decisive is so small that the costs of voting exceed the benefits. Some authors propose that civic duty or expressive voting explain why individuals vote. However, these explanations are not completely satisfactory. Five facts characterize… 

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Scholars have recently reworked the traditional calculus of voting model by adding a term for benefits to others. Although the probability that a single vote affects the outcome of an election is

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