• Corpus ID: 39333300

Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitve Realities, and Antitrust Policy

  title={Buyer Cartels Versus Buying Groups: Legal Distinctions, Competitve Realities, and Antitrust Policy},
  author={Peter C. Carstensen},
  journal={William \& Mary Business Law Review},
  • P. Carstensen
  • Published 3 September 2010
  • Business
  • William & Mary Business Law Review
The existence and exploitation of buyer power is emerging as an important concern for antitrust as the public enforcement of antitrust law itself is re-emerging as part of the renewed recognition that markets require rules in order to operate efficiently and in socially desirable ways. Buyer cartels are per se illegal but buying groups are subject to the "rule of reason" in antitrust law; yet, the two types of activity are hard to distinguish in a variety of circumstances. Moreover, neither… 
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See Klish, supra note 69
    The Federal Trade Commission's 2005 opinion reinstating the case is
    • 140 F.T.C. 123
    The GE-Westinghouse consent degree that eliminated interdependent pricing of electrical equipment is a model
    • 1977
    See United States v
    • Topco Assocs
    • 1972
    Consistent with that observation, other scholars have found substantial losses to sellers resulting from buyer cartels
    • Sources of Gains in Horizontal Mergers: Evidence from Customer, Supplier, and Rival Firms
    • 1997
    See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text
      supra note 3, at 11 (discussing DOJ challenge to the merger of United Health and PacifiCare)