Business ties and proxy voting by mutual funds

@article{Davis2007BusinessTA,
  title={Business ties and proxy voting by mutual funds},
  author={Gerald F. Davis and E. Han Kim},
  journal={Journal of Financial Economics},
  year={2007},
  volume={85},
  pages={552-570}
}
Abstract The magnitude of mutual funds’ business ties with their portfolio firms is documented and is linked to funds’ proxy votes at specific firms and to overall voting practices. Aggregate votes at the fund family level indicate a positive relation between business ties and the propensity to vote with management. Votes at specific firms, however, reveal that funds are no more likely to vote with management of client firms than of non-clients. Because the votes took place when funds knew… Expand

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