Bureaucratic choice and nonoptimal provision of public goods: Theory and evidence

@article{Hayes1998BureaucraticCA,
  title={Bureaucratic choice and nonoptimal provision of public goods: Theory and evidence},
  author={Kathy J. Hayes and Laura Razzolini and Leola B. Ross},
  journal={Public Choice},
  year={1998},
  volume={94},
  pages={1-20}
}
Local governments' allocation decisions are modeled in the context of a slack maximizing bureaucrat who produces public goods according to a production function that includes both provision and the constituents' socio-economic characteristics. To gain a better understanding of the determinants of slack, comparative statics and an empirical study of Illinois municipalities are conducted. The indirect output distance function provides efficiency scores upon which we regress several variables… CONTINUE READING

Citations

Publications citing this paper.
SHOWING 1-10 OF 18 CITATIONS