Building social networks under consent: A survey

  title={Building social networks under consent: A survey},
  author={Robert P. Gilles},
  • R. Gilles
  • Published 25 October 2019
  • Economics
  • ArXiv
This survey explores the literature on game-theoretic models of network formation under the hypothesis of mutual consent in link formation. The introduction of consent in link formation imposes a coordination problem in the network formation process. This survey explores the conclusions from this theory and the various methodologies to avoid the main pitfalls. The main insight originates from Myerson's work on mutual consent in link formation and his main conclusion that the empty network (the… 



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