• Corpus ID: 250311538

Building Reputations via Summary Statistics

  title={Building Reputations via Summary Statistics},
  author={Harry Di Pei},
  • H. Pei
  • Published 6 July 2022
  • Economics, Business
A patient seller interacts with a sequence of myopic consumers. Each consumer decides whether to trust the seller after she observes the number of times that the seller took each of his actions in the last K periods, but not the order with which these actions were taken. I assume that the seller’s effort and consumers’ trust are strategic complements, and that with positive probability, the seller is a commitment type who exerts the highest effort in every period. I show that the seller… 

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