Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items

@inproceedings{Goel2010BudgetCA,
  title={Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items},
  author={Gagan Goel and Sreenivas Gollapudi and Kamesh Munagala},
  booktitle={STOC},
  year={2010}
}
In this paper, we present the first approximation algorithms for the problem of designing revenue optimal Bayesian incentive compatible auctions when there are multiple (heterogeneous) items and when bidders have arbitrary demand and budget constraints (and additive valuations). Our mechanisms are surprisingly simple: We show that a sequential all-pay mechanism is a 4 approximation to the revenue of the optimal ex-interim truthful mechanism with a discrete type space for each bidder, where her… CONTINUE READING
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AUSUBEL: An efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects

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