Budget Feasible Procurement Auctions

  title={Budget Feasible Procurement Auctions},
  author={Nima Anari and Gagan Goel and Afshin Nikzad},
  journal={Oper. Res.},
We consider a simple and well-studied model for procurement problems and solve it to optimality. A buyer with a fixed budget wants to procure, from a set of available workers, a budget feasible subset that maximizes her utility: Any worker has a private reservation price and provides a publicly known utility to the buyer in case of being procured. The buyer’s utility function is additive over items. The goal is designing a direct revelation mechanism that solicits workers’ reservation prices… 

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