• DOI:10.1353/PEW.2004.0006
• Corpus ID: 170189446

Buddhism: Introducing the Buddhist Experience (review)

@article{McMahan2004BuddhismIT,
  title={Buddhism: Introducing the Buddhist Experience (review)},
  author={David L. McMahan},
  journal={Philosophy East and West},
  year={2004},
  volume={54},
  pages={268 - 270}
}

• David L. McMahan
• Published 26 March 2004
• Philosophy
• Philosophy East and West

Ram-Prasad takes Śrı̄ Hars ̇ a’s position as akin to naturalism, by which he understands a brand of analytic philosophy involving an attitude of suspension of metaphysics as we find it in Wittgenstein and Strawson. In section 4 Ram-Prasad offers comparative remarks on David Hume and Śrı̄ Hars ̇ a with regard to the problem of causality. Śrı̄ Hars ̇ a is represented as having argued that causal connections that are reported in our experience are not there in the world independent of cognition. Ram-Prasad takes this to be a modest view in that such a position neither goes beyond nor falls short of the deliverance of cognition. He concludes his book with observations on the problem of perception against the backdrop of the direct theory of perception, representationalism, and adverbial theory of consciousness of the Western tradition as well as Indian theories of perception involving the thesis of nirākāratva and that of sākāratva. Śrı̄ Hars ̇ a rejects the direct theories of perception. This implies a suspension of metaphysical commitment to objects of perception, and this is consistent with the variety of non-realism developed in the book. Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad deserves our appreciation and praise for being able to present a reconstruction of Advaita philosophy in a comparative setting, basing his interpretations mostly on three great Advaita philosophers. But he has left out many others, notably Prakāśātman, whom we all take to be one of the great philosophers of the school. It seems to me that by treating dr ̇ s ̇ t ̇ is ̇ r ̇ s ̇ t ̇ ivāda as a variety of idealism and thinking that Prakasātman supports it, he avoids discussing this Advaitin and his committed followers. But he should have argued more elaborately for such an omission. I also miss a statement of his attitude toward the philosophical concepts of threefold reality and ajñāna as well as toward soteriological doctrines like ekajı̄vavāda and pratibimbavāda. I look forward to a statement of his position on these concepts and on Prakāśātman and his followers. It would be churlish to cavil at such an excellent work, but if the book is reprinted the author should consider whether ‘‘designating as having equal status’’ (p. 112) is the proper translation of sāmānādhikaran ̇ yavyapadeśah ̇ , and whether the Sanskrit verse from Sureśvara as quoted in note 5 (p. 21) has been properly spelled. That said, I hope this book receives the recognition it is due from the academicians of both traditions.