• Corpus ID: 18703672

Bucklin Voting is Broadly Resistant to Control

  title={Bucklin Voting is Broadly Resistant to Control},
  author={G. Erd{\'e}lyi and Lena Schend and J{\"o}rg Rothe},
Electoral control models ways of changing the outcome of an election via such actions as adding/deleting/partitioning either candidates or voters. These actions modify an election's participation structure and aim at either making a favorite candidate win ("constructive control") or prevent a despised candidate from winning ("destructive control"), which yields a total of 22 standard control scenarios. To protect elections from such control attempts, computational complexity has been used to… 

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