Brogaard and Salerno on antirealism and the conditional fallacy

  title={Brogaard and Salerno on antirealism and the conditional fallacy},
  author={Luca Moretti},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
  • L. Moretti
  • Published 2008
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophical Studies
Brogaard and Salerno (2005, Nous, 39, 123–139) have argued that antirealism resting on a counterfactual analysis of truth is flawed because it commits a conditional fallacy by entailing the absurdity that there is necessarily an epistemic agent. Brogaard and Salerno’s argument relies on a formal proof built upon the criticism of two parallel proofs given by Plantinga (1982, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 56, 47–70) and Rea (2000, Nous, 34, 291–301). If this… Expand
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