British Intelligence and the Fear of a Soviet Attack on Allied Communications

@article{Goodman2016BritishIA,
  title={British Intelligence and the Fear of a Soviet Attack on Allied Communications},
  author={Michael S. Goodman and Huw Dylan},
  journal={Cryptologia},
  year={2016},
  volume={40},
  pages={15 - 32}
}
Abstract This article considers British intelligence fears about a Soviet attack on Allied communications. It includes a reproduction of a 1959 assessment by the Joint Intelligence Committee focusing on the means of communication across the Atlantic, and the means by which the Soviet Union could interfere or intercept them. 
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