Bribing Voters

@inproceedings{Bo2007BribingV,
  title={Bribing Voters},
  author={E Bo},
  year={2007}
}
We present a model of influence over collective decisions made through voting. We show how an outside party offering incentives to a committee can manipulate the committee’s decisions at no cost and induce inefficient outcomes. A key condition is that the outsider be able to reward decisive votes differently. Inefficiency results from voting externalities. We relax all initial assumptions to investigate how to insulate committees. We study different information settings, credibility assumptions… CONTINUE READING
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