• DOI:10.1145/2976749.2978321
Corpus ID: 6293725

Breaking Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization with Intel TSX

@article{Jang2016BreakingKA,
  title={Breaking Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization with Intel TSX},
  author={Yeongjin Jang and S. Lee and Taesoo Kim},
  journal={Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security},
  year={2016}
}

• Yeongjin Jang, S. Lee, Taesoo Kim
• Published 2016
• Computer Science
• Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Kernel hardening has been an important topic since many applications and security mechanisms often consider the kernel as part of their Trusted Computing Base (TCB). Among various hardening techniques, Kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (KASLR) is the most effective and widely adopted defense mechanism that can practically mitigate various memory corruption vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflow and use-after-free. In principle, KASLR is secure as long as no memory leak vulnerability… Expand

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