Breakdown of the internet under intentional attack.

@article{Cohen2001BreakdownOT,
  title={Breakdown of the internet under intentional attack.},
  author={Reuven Cohen and Keren Erez and Daniel ben-Avraham and Shlomo Havlin},
  journal={Physical review letters},
  year={2001},
  volume={86 16},
  pages={
          3682-5
        }
}
We study the tolerance of random networks to intentional attack, whereby a fraction p of the most connected sites is removed. We focus on scale-free networks, having connectivity distribution P(k) approximately k(-alpha), and use percolation theory to study analytically and numerically the critical fraction p(c) needed for the disintegration of the network, as well as the size of the largest connected cluster. We find that even networks with alpha < or = 3, known to be resilient to random… Expand

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