Braess's Paradox in Epidemic Game: Better Condition Results in Less Payoff

  title={Braess's Paradox in Epidemic Game: Better Condition Results in Less Payoff},
  author={Haifeng Zhang and Zi Xi Yang and Zhi-Xi Wu and Bing-Hong Wang and Tao Zhou},
  journal={Scientific Reports},
Facing the threats of infectious diseases, we take various actions to protect ourselves, but few studies considered an evolving system with competing strategies. In view of that, we propose an evolutionary epidemic model coupled with human behaviors, where individuals have three strategies: vaccination, self-protection and laissez faire, and could adjust their strategies according to their neighbors' strategies and payoffs at the beginning of each new season of epidemic spreading. We found a… 

Human disease-behavior interactions on complex networks models :incorporating evolutionary game into epidemiology

Behavioral epidemiology based on game theory is proposed, which involves the interactions between disease dynamics and human behavior in complex networks and finds that adaptive protection can effectively eradicate the disease and result in an optimal level of pruning infected links.

Disease dynamics in a stochastic network game: a little empathy goes a long way in averting outbreaks

A stochastic network disease game model is proposed that captures the self-interests of individuals during the spread of a susceptible-infected-susceptible disease and shows that empathy is more effective than risk-aversion in the role played by the response of the infected versus the susceptible individuals on disease eradication.

Disease dynamics on a network game: a little empathy goes a long way

A stochastic network disease game model that captures the self-interests of individuals during the spread of a susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) disease is proposed and shows that there is a critical level of concern, i.e., empathy, by the sick individuals above which disease is eradicated fast.

Self-Awareness-Based Resource Allocation Strategy for Containment of Epidemic Spreading

A novel resource allocation model by considering the awareness of self-protection of individuals and the effects of network structure on the coupled dynamics finds that the degree heterogeneity promotes the outbreak of disease, and the network structure does not alter the optimal phenomenon in behavior response.

Effects of behavioral response and vaccination policy on epidemic spreading - an approach based on evolutionary-game dynamics

The findings indicate that any disease-control policy should be exercised with extreme care: its success depends on the complex interplay among the intrinsic mathematical rules of epidemic spreading, governmental policies, and behavioral responses of individuals.

Interplay between the local information based behavioral responses and the epidemic spreading in complex networks

This study introduces a new class of individuals, SF, to the classical susceptible-infected-recovered model and indicates that, with the increasing of the response rate, the epidemic threshold is enhanced and the prevalence of epidemic is reduced.



Imitation dynamics of vaccination behaviour on social networks

This work sheds light on how imitation of peers shapes individual vaccination choices in social networks, and integrates an epidemiological process into a simple agent-based model of adaptive learning, which suggests parallels to historical scenarios in which vaccination coverage provided herd immunity for some time, but then rapidly dropped.

On the existence of a threshold for preventive behavioral responses to suppress epidemic spreading

It is shown that, given any infection strength and contact topology, there exists a region in the behavior-related parameter space such that infection cannot survive in long run and is completely contained.

Erratic Flu Vaccination Emerges from Short-Sighted Behavior in Contact Networks

This work investigates the interplay between contact patterns, influenza-related behavior, and disease dynamics by incorporating game theory into network models and demonstrates that rich and complex dynamics can result from the interaction between infectious diseases, human contact pattern, and behavior.

Evolving public perceptions and stability in vaccine uptake.

Imperfect Vaccine Aggravates the Long-Standing Dilemma of Voluntary Vaccination

It is shown that increasing effectiveness of vaccination always increases the number of effectively vaccinated individuals and therefore attenuates the epidemic strain, and the results suggest that ‘number is traded for efficiency’: although increases in vaccination effectiveness lead to uptake drops due to free-riding effects, the impact of the epidemic can be better mitigated.

A simulation analysis to characterize the dynamics of vaccinating behaviour on contact networks

For populations where infection can spread only through social contact network, relatively small differences in parameter values relating to perceived risk or vaccination behavior at the individual level can translate into large differences in population-level outcomes such as final size and final number vaccinated.

Imitation dynamics predict vaccinating behaviour

  • C. Bauch
  • Biology
    Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
  • 2005
A game dynamic model is developed in which individuals adopt strategies according to an imitation dynamic (a learning process), and base vaccination decisions on disease prevalence and perceived risks of vaccines and disease.