# Bounds for the Query Complexity of Approximate Equilibria

@article{Goldberg2013BoundsFT,
title={Bounds for the Query Complexity of Approximate Equilibria},
author={Paul W. Goldberg and Aaron Roth},
journal={ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)},
year={2013},
volume={4},
pages={1 - 25}
}
• Published 26 August 2016
• Computer Science, Economics
• ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)
We analyze the number of payoff queries needed to compute approximate equilibria of multi-player games. We find that query complexity is an effective tool for distinguishing the computational difficulty of alternative solution concepts, and we develop new techniques for upper- and lower bounding the query complexity. For binary-choice games, we show logarithmic upper and lower bounds on the query complexity of approximate correlated equilibrium. For well-supported approximate correlated…
32 Citations

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