Bottom-Up Corporate Governance ∗

  title={Bottom-Up Corporate Governance ∗},
  author={Augustin Landier and David Sraer and David Thesmar},
  • Augustin Landier, David Sraer, David Thesmar
  • Published 2005
This article empirically relates the internal organization of a firm with decision making quality and corporate performance. We call “independent from the CEO” a top executive who joined the firm before the current CEO was appointed. In a very robust way, firms with a smaller fraction of independent executives exhibit (1) a lower level of profitability and (2) lower shareholder returns following large acquisitions. These results are unaffected when we control for traditional governance measures… CONTINUE READING
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