Body or mind: children's categorizing of pretense.

  title={Body or mind: children's categorizing of pretense.},
  author={Angeline S. Lillard},
  journal={Child development},
  volume={67 4},
  • A. Lillard
  • Published 1 August 1996
  • Psychology
  • Child development
Researchers studying early social cognition have been particularly interested in pretend play and have obtained evidence indicating that young children do not understand that pretending involves mental representation. The present research investigates whether children think of pretending as a mental state at all, by looking at whether they cluster it with other mental states or with physical processes when making certain judgments. The results from 5 experiments suggest that most children under… 

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