BoMaNet: Boolean Masking of an Entire Neural Network

@article{Dubey2020BoMaNetBM,
  title={BoMaNet: Boolean Masking of an Entire Neural Network},
  author={Anuj Dubey and Rosario Cammarota and Aydin Aysu},
  journal={2020 IEEE/ACM International Conference On Computer Aided Design (ICCAD)},
  year={2020},
  pages={1-9}
}
Recent work on stealing machine learning (ML) models from inference engines with physical side-channel attacks warrant an urgent need for effective side-channel defenses. This work proposes the first fully-masked neural network inference engine design. Masking uses secure multi-party computation to split the secrets into random shares and to decorrelate the statistical relation of secret-dependent computations to side-channels (e.g., the power draw). In this work, we construct secure hardware… 
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