Blocking Definitions of Materialism

  title={Blocking Definitions of Materialism},
  author={John Hawthorne},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
  • J. Hawthorne
  • Published 1 August 2002
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophical Studies
It is often thought that materialism about themind can be clarified using the concept of supervenience. But there is a difficulty. Amaterialist should admit the possibility ofghosts and thus should allow that a world mightduplicate the physical character of our worldand enjoy, in addition, immaterial beings withmental properties. So materialists can't claimthat every world that is physicallyindistinguishable from our world is alsomentally indistinguishable; and this is wellknown. What is less… 
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