Bitcoin over Tor isn't a Good Idea

@article{Biryukov2014BitcoinOT,
  title={Bitcoin over Tor isn't a Good Idea},
  author={Alex Biryukov and Ivan Pustogarov},
  journal={2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy},
  year={2014},
  pages={122-134}
}
Bit coin is a decentralized P2P digital currency in which coins are generated by a distributed set of miners and transactions are broadcasted via a peer-to-peer network. While Bit coin provides some level of anonymity (or rather pseudonymity) by encouraging the users to have any number of random-looking Bit coin addresses, recent research shows that this level of anonymity is rather low. This encourages users to connect to the Bit coin network through anonymizers like Tor and motivates… 

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