Bitcoin Security under Temporary Dishonest Majority

@article{Avarikioti2019BitcoinSU,
  title={Bitcoin Security under Temporary Dishonest Majority},
  author={Georgia Avarikioti and L. K{\"a}ppeli and Yuyi Wang and Roger Wattenhofer},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2019},
  volume={abs/1908.00427}
}
We prove Bitcoin is secure under temporary dishonest majority. We assume the adversary can corrupt a specific fraction of parties and also introduce crash failures, i.e., some honest participants are offline during the execution of the protocol. We demand a majority of honest online participants on expectation. We explore three different models and present the requirements for proving Bitcoin’s security in all of them: we first examine a synchronous model, then extend to a bounded delay model… Expand
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