• Corpus ID: 52161966

Bitcoin Mining: A Game Theoretic Analysis

  title={Bitcoin Mining: A Game Theoretic Analysis},
  author={Rajani Singh and Ashutosh Dhar Dwivedi and Gautam Srivastava},
  journal={IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch.},
Bitcoin is a decentralized cryptocurrency payment system, working without a single administrator or a third party bank. A bitcoin is created by miners, using complex mathematical “proof of work” procedure by computing hashes. For each successful attempt, miners get rewards in terms of bitcoin and transaction fees. Miners participate in mining to get this reward as income. Mining of cryptocurrency such as bitcoin becomes a common interest among the miners as the bitcoin market value is very high… 

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