Biosecurity: responsible stewardship of bioscience in an age of catastrophic terrorism.

@article{Kwik2003BiosecurityRS,
  title={Biosecurity: responsible stewardship of bioscience in an age of catastrophic terrorism.},
  author={Gigi Kwik and Joseph R. Fitzgerald and Thomas V Inglesby and Tara O'Toole},
  journal={Biosecurity and bioterrorism : biodefense strategy, practice, and science},
  year={2003},
  volume={1 1},
  pages={
          27-35
        }
}
BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH has undergone tremendous growth and transformation since 1876, when Robert Koch identified Bacillus anthracis as the causative agent of anthrax, since the structure of DNA was solved in 1953, and even since a “rough draft” of the human genome was completed in February 2001. This expansion of knowledge and the powers it brings shows no signs of slowing, and will undoubtedly bring vast benefits in diagnosing, preventing, and curing disease, and in improving agriculture… Expand
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