Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology

  title={Biodefense in the Age of Synthetic Biology},
  author={Division on Earth},
The Need for Modernization of Biosecurity in the Post-COVID World
The first hypothesis is that it was due to a naturally occurring zoonotic jump, and the second contends that it spread due to an accidental dispersion of a laboratory-acquired infection in Wuhan, China.
Making Security Viral: Shifting Engineering Biology Culture and Publishing.
Considerations are described and suggestions for enhancing security in the publication of synthetic biology research and techniques to build and support a safe and secure research enterprise that is able to maximize its positive impacts and minimize any negative outcomes.
Chapter 12 Foresight in Synthetic Biology and Biotechnology Threats
Rapid developments in the fields of synthetic biology and biotechnology have caused shifts in the biological risk landscape and are key drivers of future threats. From a security perspective,
Balancing Act: Precision Medicine and National Security.
Current scientific and technological developments in precision medicine are described and the dual-use risks of employing these tools and capabilities to exert disruptive influence upon human health, economics, social structure, military capabilities, and global dimensions of power are elucidated.
Towards Good Governance on Dual-Use Biotechnology for Global Sustainable Development
It is argued that governance of the dual-use risks of biotechnology should avoid the traditional bottom-up or top-down modes, and the governance for dual- use biotechnology could be improved if the four-stage experimentalist governance model is followed.
Overstatements and Understatements in the Debate on Synthetic Biology, Bioterrorism and Ethics
  • A. Melin
  • Philosophy
    Frontiers in Bioengineering and Biotechnology
  • 2021
It is argued that the principle of precaution is more justified as a point of departure for assessing advancements within synthetic biology, because there is a potential risk that they may make it easier for terrorist groups to create and spread known pathogenic viruses.
Beyond the List: Bioagent-Agnostic Signatures Could Enable a More Flexible and Resilient Biodefense Posture Than an Approach Based on Priority Agent Lists Alone
This work proposes integrating the results of multi-omics studies to identify bioagent-agnostic signatures (BASs) of disease—namely, patterns of biomarkers that accurately and reproducibly predict the impacts of infection or intoxication without prior knowledge of the causative agent.
Biosecurity for Synthetic Biology and Emerging Biotechnologies: Critical Challenges for Governance
The rate of development and research related to synthetic biology for both industry and academia has increased over the past two decades, with applications in medicine, medicine, energy, environmental remediation, food production, and general industry.