Biker’s Dilemma: Cooperation between Foes
@article{Svenstrup2001BikersDC, title={Biker’s Dilemma: Cooperation between Foes}, author={M. Svenstrup and F. B. Christiansen}, journal={Selection}, year={2001}, volume={1}, pages={147-152} }
Cooperative behavior is subject to exploitation by individuals that are unwilling to share resources or efforts. Evolu- tion of social behavior by individual selection is therefore difficult to achieve. The study of simple symmetric two-player games of cooperation and defection suggest ways to circumvent this difficulty, the game of Prisoner™s Dilemma in particular. This game has nevertheless failed to explain recently reported social behavior among lions with persistent differences in… Expand
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The evolution of n-player cooperation-threshold games and ESS bifurcations.
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