Biker’s Dilemma: Cooperation between Foes

@article{Svenstrup2001BikersDC,
  title={Biker’s Dilemma: Cooperation between Foes},
  author={M. Svenstrup and F. B. Christiansen},
  journal={Selection},
  year={2001},
  volume={1},
  pages={147-152}
}
Cooperative behavior is subject to exploitation by individuals that are unwilling to share resources or efforts. Evolu- tion of social behavior by individual selection is therefore difficult to achieve. The study of simple symmetric two-player games of cooperation and defection suggest ways to circumvent this difficulty, the game of Prisoner™s Dilemma in particular. This game has nevertheless failed to explain recently reported social behavior among lions with persistent differences in… Expand
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