Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders

  title={Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist market with heterogeneously informed traders},
  author={Lawrence R. Glosten and Paul R. Milgrom},
  journal={Journal of Financial Economics},

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