Bias and Reasoning: Haidt’s Theory of Moral Judgment

  title={Bias and Reasoning: Haidt’s Theory of Moral Judgment},
  author={S Matthew Liao},
A topic of significant interest among social psychologists today is the extent to which intuitions, as opposed to reasoning, play a role in determining moral judgments (Haidt, 2001; Greene and Haidt, 2002; Pizarro and Bloom, 2003). Labeling the automatic, effortless, rapid process of intuitions as System 1, and the controlled, effortful, slow process of reasoning as System 2, a dominant perspective in developmental psychology — following the works of Piaget and Kohlberg — has been that our… 

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The emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.

  • J. Haidt
  • Psychology
    Psychological review
  • 2001
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