Beyond the Machine

  title={Beyond the Machine},
  author={Alisha C. Holland and Brian Palmer-Rubin},
  journal={Comparative Political Studies},
  pages={1186 - 1223}
Organizational membership is one of the strongest, yet overlooked, predictors of vote buying across Latin America. We argue that this relationship is driven by the fact that politicians outsource some of their vote-buying efforts to interest associations. In contrast to the existing literature that focuses on party brokers, who are loyal to a single political machine, we introduce the concepts of organizational brokers, who represent interest associations and renegotiate ties to political… 

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