Beyond Bootstrapping: A New Account of Evidential Relevance

  title={Beyond Bootstrapping: A New Account of Evidential Relevance},
  author={M. Culler},
  journal={Philosophy of Science},
  pages={561 - 579}
  • M. Culler
  • Published 1995
  • Mathematics
  • Philosophy of Science
This paper investigates the adequacy of evidential relevance relations proposed by Glymour and others. These accounts incorporate, as a necessary condition, what I call the Positive Instance Condition (PIC): the evidence statement and auxiliary assumptions entail a "positive instance" of the hypothesis. I argue that any account which incorporates PIC as a necessary condition while allowing "bootstrap testing" is doomed to fail. A nonbootstrapping evidential relevance relation of similar form is… Expand
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