Between ignorance and truth: Partition dependence and learning in judgment under uncertainty.

@article{See2006BetweenIA,
  title={Between ignorance and truth: Partition dependence and learning in judgment under uncertainty.},
  author={Kelly E. See and Craig R. Fox and Yuval Rottenstreich},
  journal={Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition},
  year={2006},
  volume={32 6},
  pages={
          1385-402
        }
}
In 3 studies, participants viewed sequences of multiattribute objects (e.g., colored shapes) appearing with varying frequencies and judged the likelihood of the attributes of those objects. Judged probabilities reflected a compromise between (a) the frequency with which each attribute appeared and (b) the ignorance prior probability cued by the number of distinct values that the focal attribute could take on. Thus, judged probabilities were partition dependent, varying with the number of events… 

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