Corpus ID: 173173278

Between Fairness and a Mistrial : Consensus Under a Deadline

  title={Between Fairness and a Mistrial : Consensus Under a Deadline},
  author={Marina Bannikova and Lihi Naamani-Dery and Svetlana Obraztsova and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein},
Jury trial is, perhaps, the most prominent example of seeking a consensus. The process is particularly difficult if the judge places a deadline by which the jury must reach a unanimous decision, otherwise declaring a mistrial. A mistrial is commonly perceived to be worse than any decision the jury might render. As a result, while each juror has her own idea about the fairness of each possible trial outcome, she may eventually choose to vote for a less fair outcome, rather than cause a mistrial… Expand

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