Between Belief and Disbelief

@inproceedings{Feldman2018BetweenBA,
  title={Between Belief and Disbelief},
  author={Richard Feldman and E. Conee},
  year={2018}
}
Sometimes instead of believing or disbelieving a proposition one does not take a stand on it. This essay explores that middle ground. We begin by distinguishing a variety of different attitudes or cognitive relations one might have to a proposition that one does not believe or disbelieve. We argue that identifying all of them as suspending judgment or withholding judgment neglects important differences. We then discuss epistemic evaluations of these attitudes and relations. Finally, we examine… Expand
3 Citations

References

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