Betting on Hitler - the Value of Political Connections in Nazi Germany

@article{Voth2005BettingOH,
  title={Betting on Hitler - the Value of Political Connections in Nazi Germany},
  author={Hans Joachim Voth and Thomas P. Ferguson},
  journal={CEPR Discussion Paper Series},
  year={2005}
}
This paper examines the value of connections between German industry and the Nazi movement in early 1933. Drawing on previously unused contemporary sources about management and supervisory board composition and stock returns, we find that one out of seven firms, and a large proportion of the biggest companies, had substantive links with the National Socialist German Workers’ Party. Firms supporting the Nazi movement experienced unusually high returns, outperforming unconnected ones by 5% to 8… 
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