Best-response auctions

@inproceedings{Nisan2011BestresponseA,
  title={Best-response auctions},
  author={Noam Nisan and Michael Schapira and Gregory Valiant and Aviv Zohar},
  booktitle={EC},
  year={2011}
}
We present a new framework for auction design and analysis that we term "best-response auctions". We use this framework to show that the simple and myopic best-response dynamics converge to the VCG outcome and are incentive compatible in several well-studied auction environments (Generalized Second Price auctions, and auctions with unit-demand bidders). Thus, we establish that in these environments, given that all other bidders are repeatedly best-responding, the best course of action for a… CONTINUE READING
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