# Bernoulli factories and black-box reductions in mechanism design

@article{Dughmi2017BernoulliFA,
title={Bernoulli factories and black-box reductions in mechanism design},
author={Shaddin Dughmi and Jason D. Hartline and Robert D. Kleinberg and Rad Niazadeh},
journal={ArXiv},
year={2017},
volume={abs/1703.04143}
}
In this letter, we report on our work providing a polynomial time reduction from Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism design to Bayesian algorithm design for welfare maximization problems. Unlike prior results, our reduction achieves exact incentive compatibility for problems with multidimensional and continuous type spaces.

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