Benchmark Design and Prior-independent Optimization

@article{Hartline2020BenchmarkDA,
  title={Benchmark Design and Prior-independent Optimization},
  author={J. Hartline and Aleck C. Johnsen and Yingkai Li},
  journal={2020 IEEE 61st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS)},
  year={2020},
  pages={294-305}
}
This paper compares two leading approaches for robust optimization in the models of online algorithms and mechanism design. Competitive analysis compares the performance of an online algorithm to an offline benchmark in worst-case over inputs, and prior-independent mechanism design compares the expected performance of a mechanism on an unknown distribution (of inputs, i.e., agent values) to the optimal mechanism for the distribution in worst case over distributions. For competitive analysis, a… Expand
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