Believing the best: on doxastic partiality in friendship

@article{Crawford2017BelievingTB,
  title={Believing the best: on doxastic partiality in friendship},
  author={Lindsay Crawford},
  journal={Synthese},
  year={2017},
  volume={196},
  pages={1575-1593}
}
Some philosophers argue that friendship can normatively require us to have certain beliefs about our friends that epistemic norms would prohibit. On this view, we ought to exhibit some degree of doxastic partiality toward our friends, by having certain generally favorable beliefs and doxastic dispositions that concern our friends that we would not have concerning relevantly similar non-friends. Can friendship genuinely make these normative demands on our beliefs, in ways that would conflict… CONTINUE READING

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