Beliefless Knowing

  title={Beliefless Knowing},
  author={Paul Silva},
  journal={Pacific Philosophical Quarterly},
  • Paul Silva
  • Published 2 July 2019
  • Philosophy
  • Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

Cook Wilson on knowledge and forms of thinking

John Cook Wilson is an important predecessor of contemporary knowledge first epistemologists: among other parallels, he claimed that knowledge is indefinable. We reconstruct four arguments for this

How to Play the Lottery Safely?

According to the safety principle, if one knows that p, one's belief that p could not easily have been false. One problem besetting this principle is the lottery problem – that of explaining why



Knowledge as a non-normative relation

According to a view I’ll call Epistemic Normativism (EN), knowledge is normative in the same sense in which paradigmatically normative properties like justification are normative. This paper argues

Does Propositional Seeing Entail Propositional Knowledge

In a 2010 article Turri puts forward some powerful considerations which suggest that Williamson's view of knowledge as the most general factive mental state is false. Turri claims that this view is

Factive and nonfactive mental state attribution

Factive mental states, such as knowing or being aware, can only link an agent to the truth; by contrast, non-factive states, such as believing or thinking, can link an agent to either truths or

Belief and Knowledge

Dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe

L'A. analyse la formation des croyances en soulignant l'importance des «dispositions a croire», des «croyances implicites» qui conduisent a un sentiment d'evidence. Il etudie les modalites

The Theory of Epistemic Justification and the Theory of Knowledge: A Divorce

Richard Foley has suggested that the search for a good theory of epistemic justification and the analysis of knowledge should be conceived of as two distinct projects. However, he has not offered