Belief-in and Belief in God

  title={Belief-in and Belief in God},
  author={Johnny N. Williams},
  journal={Religious Studies},
  pages={401 - 405}
Of all the examples of ‘belief-in’, belief in God is both the most mysterious and the most challenging. Indeed whether and how an apologist can make a case for the intellectual respectability of theistic belief, depends upon the nature of this ‘belief-in’. I shall attempt to elucidate this matter by an analysis of the relation of ‘belief-in’ to ‘belief-that’ and by treating belief in God as a special case of ‘belief-in’. 
4 Citations
Belief-In Revisited: A Reply To Williams
In ‘Belief-In and Belief in God’ (Religious Studies, 28, 1992), J. N. Williams suggests that belief in God cannot be rational unless one has rational beliefs that God exists. While agreeing with his
Intention and Normative Belief
I defend the view that we act “under the guise of the good.” More specifically, I argue that an intention to do something is a belief that one ought to do it. I show how conflicts in intention and
Wittgenstein, Dewey, and the Possibility of Religion
John Dewey points out in A Common Faith (1934) that what stands in the way of religious belief for many is the apparent commitment of Western religious traditions to supernatural phenomena and
JSP 20-1fm.indd
  • 2006