Belief Change as Propositional Update

  title={Belief Change as Propositional Update},
  author={Ren{\'e}e Elio and Francis Jeffry Pelletier},
  journal={Cogn. Sci.},
This study examines the problem of belief revision, defined as deciding which of several initially accepted sentences to disbelieve, when new information presents a logical inconsistency with the initial set. In the first three experiments, the initial sentence set included a conditional sentence, a non-conditional (ground) sentence, and an inferred conclusion drawn from the first two. The new information contradicted the inferred conclusion. Results indicated that conditional sentences were… 

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