Belgium: risk adjustment and financial responsibility in a centralised system.

@article{Schokkaert2003BelgiumRA,
  title={Belgium: risk adjustment and financial responsibility in a centralised system.},
  author={Erik Schokkaert and Carine van de Voorde},
  journal={Health policy},
  year={2003},
  volume={65 1},
  pages={
          5-19
        }
}

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