Being something: : Properties and predicative quantification

@article{Rieppel2016BeingS,
  title={Being something: : Properties and predicative quantification},
  author={Michael Rieppel},
  journal={Mind},
  year={2016},
  volume={125},
  pages={643-689}
}
If I say that Alice is everything Oscar hopes to be (healthy, wealthy, wise, etc.), I seem to be quantifying over properties. That suggestion faces an immediate difficulty, however: though Alice may be wise, she surely is not the property of being wise. This problem can be framed in terms of a substitution failure: if a predicate like ‘happy’ denoted a property, we would expect pairs like ‘Oscar is happy’ and ‘Oscar is the property of being happy’ to be equivalent, which they clearly are not. I… Expand
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