Behaviorism and psychologism: Why block's argument against behaviorism is unsound

  title={Behaviorism and psychologism: Why block's argument against behaviorism is unsound},
  author={Hanoch Ben-Yami},
  journal={Philosophical Psychology},
  pages={179 - 186}
Ned Block ((1981). Psychologism and behaviorism. Philosophical Review, 90, 5–43.) argued that a behaviorist conception of intelligence is mistaken, and that the nature of an agent's internal processes is relevant for determining whether the agent has intelligence. He did that by describing a machine which lacks intelligence, yet can answer questions put to it as an intelligent person would. The nature of his machine's internal processes, he concluded, is relevant for determining that it lacks… Expand
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