Behavioral public choice: A survey

@inproceedings{Schnellenbach2014BehavioralPC,
  title={Behavioral public choice: A survey},
  author={Jan Schnellenbach and C. Schubert},
  year={2014}
}
  • Jan Schnellenbach, C. Schubert
  • Published 2014
  • Economics
  • Public choice theory has originally been motivated by the need to correct the asymmetry, widespread in traditional welfare economics, between the motivational assumptions of market participants and policymakers: Those who played the game of politics should also be considered rational and self-interested. History repeats itself with the rise of behavioral economics: Cognitive biases discovered in market participants often induce a call for rational governments to intervene. Recently, however… CONTINUE READING
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