Behavioral Equilibrium in Economies with Adverse Selection


I propose a new solution concept–behavioral equilibrium–to study environments with players who are naive, in the sense that they fail to account for the informational content of other players’actions. A behavioral equilibrium requires that: (i) players have no incentives to deviate given their beliefs about the consequences of deviating; (ii) these beliefs… (More)


2 Figures and Tables


Citations per Year

51 Citations

Semantic Scholar estimates that this publication has 51 citations based on the available data.

See our FAQ for additional information.

Cite this paper

@inproceedings{Esponday2005BehavioralEI, title={Behavioral Equilibrium in Economies with Adverse Selection}, author={Ignacio Esponday and Lu{\'i}s Cabral and Vincent Crawford and Willie Fuchs and William Greene and Yuan-Chuan Lien}, year={2005} }